Including the parts where we come off worse.
| Approach | Where the key is born | The problem |
|---|---|---|
| Browser extension wallet | On an online machine, inside a browser | Any malicious extension, any compromised page, any clipboard monitor. The key exists on a networked device that keeps running. |
| Mobile wallet app | On an online, always-on phone | Better isolation than a browser, but the device is permanently networked and permanently persistent. “Deleted” is a policy claim. |
| Desktop wallet | On an online machine | Same exposure as the browser, with more filesystem to leak into. |
| Hardware wallet | On a dedicated offline chip | Genuinely good — and exactly what failed at Coldcard. You are trusting firmware you cannot read and an RNG you cannot audit. |
| Exchange custody | Not yours at all | Someone else holds the key. That is a different product with a different risk, and it is not self-custody. |
| Keystick | In RAM, on a machine with no network stack | Your host machine could still be physically compromised. You still have to protect the paper. |
If your computer’s firmware is already compromised at a level below the operating system, booting our stick on it does not save you. If someone is filming your desk, nothing here helps. And if you lose the paper, the money is gone — a hardware wallet with a PIN gives you a second chance that we deliberately do not.